People v. Drew - Will California\u27s New Insanity Test Ensure a More Accurate Determination of Insanity? by Traficante, Paul K.
PEOPLE V. DREW-WILL CALIFORNIA'S NEW
INSANITY TEST ENSURE A MORE
ACCURATE DETERMINATION OF
INSANITY?
Psychiatrists, courts, and laymen continue to disagree as to
what standard of conduct should constitute a defense to criminal
responsibility. Recently, the California Supreme Court redefined
the legal test for insanity, adopting the more expansive view fa-
vored by many psychiatrists. This Comment analyzes the court's
reasoning in adopting the new standard and examines the stan-
dard's purported advantages in light of psychiatric findings and
judicial experience with various insanity tests. The author ex-
presses the hope that the legislature will reexamine the problem
and promulgate a more appropriate definition of criminal in-
sanity.
INTRODUCTION
In People v. Drew' the California Supreme Court abandoned
the M'Naghten rule and adopted the American Law Institute
(AL[) test for determining insanity in criminal trials. The thesis
of this Comment is that the new insanity test does not ensure a
more just and accurate determination of insanity than did the
M'Naghten test. Drew will not clarify psychiatric testimony so as
to enable jurors to make a reasoned choice. Nor will the new test
be any easier to apply than M'Naghten. Because of the court's
failure to evaluate all the available data concerning both judicial
experience with psychiatric testimony and the reliability of psy-
chiatric diagnosis, the new formula does not achieve those
changes which the court perceived as necessary.
Part one of this Comment reviews the history of the insanity
test in California. Part two describes the Drew opinion. Part
three discusses why it was wrongly decided.
1. 22 Cal. 3d 333, 583 P.2d 1318, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1978).
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSANrrY DEFENSE IN CALIFORNIA
Since 1864 California has used the M'Naghten test to define the
defense of insanity in criminal proceedings.2
[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that, at the time of the commiting of the act, the party accused was
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not
to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know
it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.3
Responding to the recommendations of the Commission for the
Reform of Criminal Procedure, the California legislature in 1927
enacted the separate trial provisions presently found in California
Penal Code section 1026.4 The statute provides that a defendant
who pleads guilty by reason of insanity shall be tried twice.5 In
the first trial, the defendant is conclusively presumed to be sane
when the offense was committed and is tried on the issue of guilt
only.6 At this trial he may enter whatever other defenses are
available. 7 If the defendant is found guilty, he is tried again. The
sole issue at the second trial is whether the defendant was insane
when the offense was committed. 8
During the 100 years after the adoption of M'Naghten, the
courts strictly construed the M'Naghten test's language.9 Only
those defendants who lacked the cognitive capacity to realize the
wrongfulness of their conduct were treated as insane. 10 In con-
trast with this judicial interpretation of insanity, modern psychia-
try repudiated the "compartmentalization of the mind" theory
2. People v. Kelly, 10 Cal. 3d 565, 516 P.2d 875, 111 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1973); People
v. Nicolaus, 65 Cal. 2d 866, 423 P.2d 787, 56 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1967); People v.
M'Donnell, 47 Cal. 134 (1873); People v. Coffman, 24 Cal. 230, 235 (1864).
3. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843); accord, People v. Coffman,
24 Cal. 230, 235 (1864) (slight variation in language).
4. Ch. 346, 1925 Cal. Stats.; CALIFORNIA COMSSION FOR THE REFORM OF CRMI-
INAL PROCEDURE, REPORT 16, 17 (1927); The Reform of Criminal Procedure, 1 CAL.
ST. B.J. 103, 104 (1926).
5. CA. PENAL CODE § 1026 (Deering 1979) provides:
When a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, and also joins
with it another plea or pleas, he shall first be tried as if he had entered
such other plea or pleas only, and in such trial he shall be conclusively
presumed to have been sane at the time the offense is alleged to have
been committed. If the jury shall find the defendant guilty, or if the de-
fendant pleads only not guilty by reason of insanity, then the question
whether the defendant was sane or insane at the time the offense was




9. See People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
This was the first time the California Supreme Court sanctioned a broadening of
the narrow M'Naghten "knowledge" test. During the period from 1864 to 1964 the
California Supreme Court had strictly interpreted the "knowledge" term.
10. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 616-17 (2d Cir. 1966).
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which was the basis of the M'Naghten doctrine." During the
present century psychiatrists have extensively criticized the
M'Naghten rule.12 They contend that mental illness may have lit-
tle or no impact upon an individual's capacity to comprehend that
what he is doing is wrong and unlawful.' 3 Insanity may affect the
entire personality of an individual, including his ability to control
his behavior.14 Consequently, the M'Naghten critics assert that
focus upon the "knowledge" element of the test causes the im-
prisonment rather than the treatment of mentally handicapped
offenders.
5
In People v. Wolff 16 the California Supreme Court acknowl-
edged these criticisms of M'Naghten and adopted a liberal inter-
pretation of the rule. The term "know" was construed to mean
the possession of sufficient mental capacity to "appreciate or un-
derstand" the nature and quality of the defendant's act.'7 The in-
sanity test was expanded to include examination of the offender's
ability to reflect maturely and meaningfully upon the morality
and gravity of his contemplated act.' 8 Under a strict construction
of M'Naghten's "knowledge" requirement, many offenders were
able to articulate a knowledge of the wrongfulness of their con-
duct, yet were incapable of intellectually and morally understand-
ing that what they had done should be repulsive to them. 9 Mere
capacity to articulate knowledge of wrong was sufficient to deny
the insanity defense prior to Wolff.20 Under Wolfs liberal inter-
pretation of the standard, the defense would be denied only if the
11. See A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 46 (1967). The objection to the
M'Naghten rule is that it does not comport with modem theories of medical sci-
ence. Modern psychiatry is opposed to the older theory which divides the mind
into the separate compartments of the will, the emotions, and the intellect. See
United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 622 (2d Cir. 1966); H. SiLviNG, ESSAYS ON
MENTAL INcAPAcrrY AND CRIMINAL CONDUCT 92 (1967).
12. S. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 183-86 (1925).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 99-122.
15. BRITISH HOME OFFICE, DEPT. OF HEALTH AND Soc. SEC., REPORT OF THE
CommrrrEE ON MENTALLY ABNORmAL OFFENDERS 218 (Oct. 1975) [hereinafter cited
as BRITSH COMMrEE]. The English Committee agreed with the other commenta-
tors that if M'Naghten were strictly interpreted, it would provide limited protec-
tion to most classes of mentally disordered offenders.
16. 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).




defendant truly understood the moral evil of his conduct.2' Thus,
the new interpretation of insanity permitted more defendants to
successfully invoke the insanity defense.
Another line of California cases commencing with People v.
Wells2 2 developed the concept of "diminished capacity" to further
ameliorate the sometimes harsh effect of M'Naghten. Despite the
statutory bifurcation prohibiting introduction of evidence of the
defendant's insanity at the guilt stage, Wells approved the admis-
sion of evidence of diminished mental capacity which tended to
disprove specific criminal intent.23 The court held that admission
of such evidence was required by due process because evidence
of diminished capacity tends to disprove an element of the
crime.24 Subsequent cases expanded Wells to allow admission at
the guilt phase of evidence of diminished mental capacity caused
by intoxication, trauma, or disease tending to disprove intent.
25
In People v. Cantrell,26 the rule was extended to encompass the
impairment of volition. Cantrell held that a defendant who raises
the defense of diminished capacity at the guilt phase of trial may
demonstrate that his act was the product of an irresistible im-
pulse resulting from mental disease.27 The most recent decision
in this line, People v. Wetmore,2 8 compels trial courts to admit all
evidence of insanity at the guilt phase on the issue of specific in-
tent to commit the crime charged. Wetmore declares that the at-
tempt to distinguish evidence of insanity from evidence of
diminished capacity is illogical because it keeps out evidence of
the defendant's mental condition.29 The court reasoned that the
21. People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
22. 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949).
23. Id. at 349, 202 P.2d at 65.
24. Id. at 346, 351, 355, 202 P.2d at 63, 66, 68.
25. See, e.g., People v. Bassett, 69 Cal. 2d 122, 443 P.2d 777, 70 Cal. Rptr. 193
(1968); People v. Goedecke, 65 Cal. 2d 850, 423 P.2d 777, 56 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1967);
People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966); People v. Gor-
shen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959).
26. 8 Cal. 3d 672, 504 P.2d 1256, 105 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1973).
27. Id. at 685, 504 P.2d at 1264, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 800-01. See generally H. WEI-
HOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 94-100 (1954). See also T. SZASZ,
LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 131-32 (1963).
28. 22 Cal. 3d 318, 583 P.2d 1308, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1978).
29. Id. Admission of evidence of insanity at the guilt phase of trial was origi.
nally perceived as a danger to be avoided. It was feared that such a liberal eviden-
tiary rule would permit the defendant to submit great masses of information
having no bearing upon the question of whether the offense was committed. As a
consequence, the jury would be unduly influenced by sympathy or confused as to
the issue. CALIFORNIA COMMISSION FOR THE REFORM OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RE-
PORT 16-17 (1927).
It appears that the Commission failed to explore the full legal ramifications of
excluding evidence of mental impairment upon the issue of intent. For criticism
and comment, see Louisell & Hazard, Insanity as a Defense: The Bifurcated Trial,
49 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 810 (1961).
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purpose of admitting evidence of mental impairment was to miti-
gate or rebut elements of the crime charged.30 Therefore, it would
be unfair to deny admission of such evidence even though it may
suggest a higher degree of mental incapacity.
3 1
With the exception of the bifurcated trial statute, the legislature
remained silent upon the issue of criminal insanity throughout
this period of case law development. Because the bifurcation
statute effected only procedural changes in the insanity rule, the
California Supreme Court construed the absence of substantive
change as tacit legislative approval of M'Naghten.32 For a period
of sixty years, the California courts rejected attacks on
M'Naghten and declined to adopt proposals for a new insanity
definition because they viewed the legislature as better equipped
to manage the complex fact finding such a decision would neces-
sitate.3 3
PEOPLE V. DREWv--THE NEW INSANITY TEST
The legal test for insanity in California is no longer the
M'Naghten rule but rather subpart 1 of the American Law Insti-
tute test: "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at
the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of law."34 In adopting the ALI rule, the California
30. People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318, 583 P.2d 1308, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1978).
31. Id.
32. "The 1927 legislation upon its face effected only procedural changes ...
but it is apparent that the Legislature had in mind the substantive law as to in-
sanity. . . ." People v. Nash, 52 Cal. 2d 36, 47, 338 P.2d 416, 422 (1959).
33. Unanimous decisions upholding M'Naghten and indicating that the legisla-
ture would be the proper forum for change include: People v. Kelly, 10 Cal. 3d 565,
516 P.2d 875, 111 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1973); People v. Wolffn 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40
Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964); People v. Darling, 58 Cal. 2d 15, 372 P.2d 316, 22 Cal. Rptr. 484
(1962); People v. Rittger, 54 Cal. 2d 720, 355 P.2d 645, 7 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1960); People
v. Nash, 52 Cal. 2d 36, 338 P.2d 416 (1959); People v. Berry, 44 Cal. 2d 426, 282 P.2d
861 (1955); People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal. 2d 876, 256 P.2d 911 (1953); People v. Hick-
man, 204 Cal. 470, 268 P. 909 (1928).
34. In full, the ALI test states:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capac-
ity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise
anti-social conduct.
Supreme Court deliberately deferred considering subpart 2 of the
test which denies the defense to sociopaths and psychopaths.
35
Historically, these types of offenders have been precluded from
asserting the insanity defense in California.36 Whether psycho-
paths will be allowed to assert the insanity defense remains an
open issue.
In Drew, the defendant violently resisted the attempts of two
police officers to remove him from a bar where he had started a
fight. Drew pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of in-
sanity to the charges -of battery, obstructing an officer, and dis-
turbing the peace. Two court-appointed psychiatrists testified
that the defendant was unable to appreciate the difference be-
tween right and wrong.37 Despite this testimony, the jury found
Drew guilty.
Neither defendant's appellate brief nor his petition for rehear-
ing attacked the trial court's jury instruction based upon the
M'Naghten rule.38 The California Supreme Court, however, per-
ceived the appeal as an opportunity to jettison the established
test and remanded the case for retrial under the ALI standard.39
Replacement of the M'Naghten test was based on the following
assumptions: (1) the ALI test would permit psychiatrists to ex-
plain the basis for the conclusions to the jury; (2) the ALI test is
superior because it is more closely attuned to modern psychiatric
theory and possesses the flexibility to adopt new theories; (3) the
ALI language is more modem and therefore superior to the
M'Naghten language; and (4) the ALI test would rationalize the
inconsistent interpretations of diminished capacity.4O
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Subpart 1 is cited in Peo-
ple v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 336, 337 n.3, 345, 583 P.2d 1318, 1319 n.3, 1324, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 275, 276 n.3, 281 (1978).
35. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 345 n.8, 583 P.2d 1318, 1324 n.8, 149 Cal. Rptr.
275, 281 n.8 (1978). Psychopaths have been characterized as persons who are intel-
lectually aware of the consequences of their acts but feel no remorse or pity and
are abnormally disposed toward repeated commission of criminal acts. See gener-
ally Hl. WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH 87-90 (1956).
36. By definition, psychopaths could not qualify under M'Naghten because
they were aware of the wrongfulness of their conduct. See H. WEIOFEN, THE
URGE TO PUNISH 87-90 (1956).
37. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 338-39, 583 P.2d 1318, 1319-20, 149 Cal. Rptr.
275, 276-77 (1978).
38. Id. at 339 n.4, 583 P.2d at 1320 n.4, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 277 n.4.
39. Id. at 337, 583 P.2d at 1319, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 276. Shortly after Drew was
decided, the California Supreme Court extended the ALI definition of insanity to
include the defense of idiocy and mental retardation in In Re Ramon M., 22 Cal. 3d
419, 584 P.2d 524, 149 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1978).
40. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 346, 583 P.2d 1318, 1325, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275, 282
(1978).
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WHY DREW Is WRONGLY DECIDED
The liberal interpretation of the M'Naghten test by the Califor-
nia courts was accepted by a number of commentators as a fair
standard for assessing criminal responsibility.41 Some jurists,
however, persisted in condemning any insanity test premised on
M'Naghten.42 They objected on the ground that modern psychia-
try had repudiated M'Naghten's exclusive emphasis upon the cog-
nitive aspects of human personality.43 It was believed that
M'Naghten was inconsistent with "modern medical knowledge
that an individual is a mentally complex being with varying de-
grees of awareness." 44
Drew adopted the reformist view despite the ameliorative effect
of the Wolff doctrine and the diminished capacity concept upon
M'Naghten's "knowledge of wrongfulness" requirement.45 How-
ever, the new test is no more likely to remedy the defects of the
insanity determination than the modern interpretation of
M'Naghten.46 The court failed to consider both historical experi-
41. "[RIegardless of how the M'Naghten test is applied elsewhere, the Califor-
nia courts have attempted to give a psychologically sound recognition to the depth
and insight required of a defendant's knowledge." SPECIAL COmMISSION ON IN-
SANITY AND CniaMAL OFFENDERS, FIRST REPORT 23 n.6 (1962).
"[E ]xpansion of diminished capacity to its present state must please those crit-
ics of M'Naughten [sic] who have longed for a medical-psychiatric test of in-
sanity." Comment, Diminished Capacity: The Middle Ground of Criminal
Responsibility, 15 SA-NTA CLARA L REV. 911, 937 (1974-75); see Comment, Dimin-
ished Capacity: Its Potential Effect in California, 3 Loy. LA.L. REV. 153, 167
(1970).
42. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals viewed adherence to even the modem
interpretation of the M'Naghten rule as unjustified. United States v. Currens, 290
F.2d 751, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1961). Justice Mosk adopted this same point of view in his
concurring opinion in People v. Kelly, 10 Cal. 3d 565, 578, 516 P.2d 875, 884, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 171, 180 (1973).
The California Penal Code Revision Committee recommended change of the
M'Naghten rule because it was allegedly invalid from a psychiatric standpoint.
However, the committee noted that change would have little impact upon practice.
Sherry, Penal Code Revision Project-Progress Report, 43 CAL. ST. B.J. 900, 916
(1968).
43. "[M'Naghten] still... falls short of acknowledging the teaching of psychi-
atry that mental aberration may not only impair knowledge of wrongfulness but
may very well destroy an individual's capacity to control or to restrain himself."
Sherry, Penal Code Rezision Project-Progress Report, 43 CAT. ST. B.J. 900, 916
(1968).
44. A. GOLDsTEIN, supra note 11, at 56-57. See generally H. WEIHOFEN, THE
URGE TO PUNISH 84 (1956).
45. People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964); People
v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949).
46. See text accompanying notes 49-124 infra.
ence with psychiatric opinion under the various insanity tests and
the empirical studies dealing with diagnosis and treatment of the
criminally insane.47 These studies indicate that judicial reliance
on contemporary psychological theory is misplaced.48
Drew Will Not Prevent Conclusory Psychiatric Testimony
In the Drew majority opinion, Justice Tobriner argued that the
ALI formula was superior to M'Naghten because the ALI stan-
dard was "broad enough to permit a psychiatrist to set before the
trier of fact a full picture of the defendant's mental impair-
ments. . ... 49 This argument reiterates the M'Naghten critics'
most common complaint, that M'Naghten keeps out evidence of
the defendant's mental state, denying the jury an accurate picture
of defendant's mental state.50 This exclusion of probative evi-
dence is supposedly attributable to the courts' practice of admit-
ting only expert testimony that satisfies the wording of the
particular insanity test. For example, a judge subscribing to
M'Naghten would contend that only psychiatric evidence of cogni-
tive impairment could be admitted because the test speaks in
terms of knowledge.51
What has actually occurred in practice, however, discredits this
complaint. The policy of most courts has been to admit any evi-
dence probative of mental aberration regardless of the phraseol-
ogy of the insanity rule.52 For example, the American Law
Institute found no American case in which psychiatric evidence
47. For historical experience, see text accompanying notes 49-63 infra. For
empirical studies, see text accompanying notes 64-89 infra.
48. Modern psychiatry lacks the quantitative accuracy of the other sciences
and should not be regarded as if it possesses equivalent reliability. Generally,
psychiatrists have been unsuccessful in predicting recidivism and have failed to
communicate with both the subjects of their examination and the jury. Comment,
The Psychiatrist's Role in Determining Accountability for Crimes: The Public Anx-
iety and an Increasing Expertise, 52 MARQ. L. REV. 380, 382 (1969); see, e.g., Katz,
Cole, & Lowery, Studies of the Diagnostic Process: The Influence of Sympton Per-
ception, Past Experience, and Ethnic Background in Diagnostic Decisions, 125 AM.
J. PSYCH. 937 (1969).
49. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 346, 583 P.2d 1318, 1325, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275, 282
(1978).
50. A. GOLDsTEiN, supra note 11, at 53.
51. Id. at 53-58.
52. For a statement of the basis for admissible evidence when there is expert
testimony, see CAL. EvID. CODE § 802 (West 1978).
'"he first and fundamental rule, then, will be that any and all conduct of the
person is admissible in evidence. There is no restriction as to the kind of conduct.
There can be none; for if a specific act does not indicate insanity it may indicate
sanity." J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 228 (1904). See also People v.
David, 12 Cal. 2d 639, 86 P.2d 811 (1939) (dealing with the scope of rebuttal conduct
a prosecutor may introduce); Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65
YALE L.J. 761, 774 (1956).
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probative of insanity was rejected by the trial court because it did
not fit the test language.5 3 Similarly, Judge Bazelon of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals noted that after twenty-five
years of trying insanity cases, the only limitations imposed on the
admissibility of evidence were made by psychiatrists them-
selves.5 4 He found that psychiatrists uniformly limited their testi-
mony to conclusory statements couched in psychiatric terms and
failed to explain the reasons behind their conclusions.5 5 Such tes-
timony was narrowly tailored to fit the language of the particular
insanity test.
56
The Durham5 7 experiment illustrates the lack of any causal re-
lationship between the insanity test terminology and the capacity
of psychiatrists to explain their opinions. The Durham test was
adopted and used by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
for a number of years and later abandoned because of judicial dis-
satisfaction with its application.58 The Durham test set forth the
following definition of insanity: "[A] n accused is not criminally
responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease
or mental defect."5 9 Psychiatrists favored this test above all other
popular formulas because it most closely approached their con-
cept of mental disorders.60 Prior to its adoption in the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, psychiatrists clamored for a standard
that would permit a dynamic and accurate description of the
53. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, app. A at 162 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
Analysis of numerous trial transcripts shows that psychiatrists are permitted to
explain their interpretation of the M'Naghten "know" term regularly. The
M'Naghten test does not straitjacket psychiatric testimony. A. GOLDSTEN, supra
note 11, at 56.
Psychosis is the term psychiatrists use to define severe mental disorder charac-
terized by delusions, visions, and loss of intellectual capacity. This is the disorder
that has been associated with the M'Naghten "knowledge" element. See H. WEI-
HOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CnmNAL DEFENSE 14-16 (1954).
54. Bazelon, Psychiatrists and the Adversary Process, SclENcIFIC Am., June
1974, at 18.
55. Id. at 20. "Psychiatry, I suppose, is the ultimate wizardry... [I] n no case
is it more difficult to elicit productive and reliable expert testimony than in cases
that call on the knowledge and practice of psychiatry." Id. at 18.
56. Id. at 21.
57. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
58. Bazelon, Psychiatrists and the Adversary Process, SciENTIFIc Am., June
1974, at 18, 21.
59. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
60. G. MORRIS, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A BLuEPRiNT FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
14 (1975); Bazelon, Psychiatrists and the Adversary Process, SczNrIFc Am., June
1974, at 18, 40.
human psyche.6 1 However, after the adoption of Durham, psychi-
atrists continued to testify in conclusory terms patterned after
the test language.62 Thus, under the most liberal definition of in-
sanity, the juries received as little psychiatric explanation of the
defendant's mental problems as they did under M'Naghten.6
3
It is unlikely that adoption of the ALI test will provide psychia-
trists with any greater oppotunity to "set before the trier of fact a
full picture of defendant's mental impairments" than they had un-
der M'Naghten. Psychiatrists will probably continue to testify in
conclusory terms that adopt the test language. Detailed psychiat-
ric explanation of the defendant's mental impairment would more
likely be accomplished by adopting strict evidentiary rules that
restrict testimony composed of psychiatric conclusions, and by re-
quiring that the nature of the defendant's illness be first ex-
plained in simple language.
Deference to Modern Psychiatry May Not Result in More Reliable
Determinations of Insanity
Although psychiatric claims are gaining wider acceptance in
American society, many behavioral scientists are beginning to
question the liberal faith which has urged greater acceptance of
psychiatric discoveries and expansion of the insanity defense.
6 4
People v. Drew is an example of the judicial inclination to shape
61. Bazelon, Psychiatrists and the Adversary Process, SCIENTIFIC Ai., June
1974, at 18, 20.
62. Id. at 21.
63. Id. Some commentators suggest that psychiatric testimony should not be
proscribed only as to conclusory evaluations but should be strictly curtailed or
eliminated altogether. See generally BRITISH COMmrTEE, supra note 15, at 222;
Fosdal, Contributions and Limitations of Psychiatric Testimony, 50 Wis. BumL. 31,
34 (April 1977).
The proposal to curtail psychiatric testimony is predicated upon courtroom frus-
tration with conflicting expert testimony and the pervasive influence of subjective
"lay" considerations. In one Swedish study, researchers found that the consist-
ently determinative factors in psychiatric findings depended upon the nature of
the crime and the incidents of prior convictions or prior hospitalizations. The
study concluded that the need for expert testimony was obviated by the fact that a
judge or jury was just as capable of assessing these elements as was a psychia-
trist. Reisner & Semmel, Abolishing the Insanity Defense: A Look at the Proposed
Federal Criminal Code Reform Act in Light of the Swedish Experience, 62 CALIF.
L. REV. 753, 781 (1974).
64. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 101-05. Psychiatrists disagree on the defini-
tion of even the most basic terms such as psychosis, mental illness, and psychopa-
thy. Invariably, value judgments greatly influence any categorization of the
individual defendant When more than a single psychiatrist testifies, conflict usu-
ally results. Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAl..L. REV.
514, 546 (1968). See, e.g., Goldberg, The Effectiveness of Clinicians' Judgments: The
Diagnosis of Organic Brain Damage From the Bender-Gestalt Test, 23 J. CONSULT-
ING PSYCH. 25, 33 (1959).
For a general discussion of the validity of psychiatric diagnosis, see Zigler &
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the law in accordance with the more vociferous elements of the
psychiatric community.
Justice Tobriner found the M'Naghten rule to be inconsistent
with current legal and psychological thought: "We cannot con-
tinue to cast human beings in an ancient and discarded psycho-
logical mould. We must at least to the best of our limited ability
accept the reality of the human psyche as expert opinion depicts
it .... ,,65 However, not only do psychiatrists disagree as to diag-
nostic judgments, but the accuracy of psychiatric predictions is
alarmingly poor.66 For example, one 1949 study measured diag-
nostic agreement between two or three psychiatrists who in-
terviewed fifty-two patients in a psychiatric clinic.6 7 The three
psychiatrists involved in the experiment totally disagreed on spe-
cific diagnoses in thirty-one percent of the cases.68 In a study con-
ducted twenty years later, psychiatrists were found to be no
closer to agreement in diagnosing mental illness than they were
in 1949. In a 1969 study conducted by Katz, Cole, and Lowery,
forty-three experienced psychiatrists diagnosed an individual af-
ter a filmed interview. 69 Seventeen of the psychiatrists concluded
that the subject was psychotic; the other twenty-six concluded he
Phillips, Psychiatric Diagnosis. A Critique, 63 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PsYcH. 607, 612
(1961).
65. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 352, 583 P.2d 1318, 1329, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275, 286
(1978). For an elucidation of the failures and advances of modern psychology, see
Schmideberg, The Promise of Psychiatry: Hopes and Disillusionment, 57 Nw. U.L.
REV. 19, 21 (1962).
66. Paradoxically, the advances of psychology have produced confusion and
disagreement concerning the most basic concepts. See, e.g., Stoler & Geertsma,
The Consistency of Psychiatrists' Clinical Judgments, 137 J. NERV. MENTAL Dis. 58,
63-64 (1963).
It has been suggested that the courts are reluctant to curtail the influence of
psychiatry because they do not want to assume full responsibility for deciding
whether a mentally ill offender should be sent to prison or to the mental hospital.
Judges may be motivated by sympathy to shift responsibility for this painful deci-
sion to psychiatrists. It is the contention of at least one writer that judges are obli-
gated to assume a more active role in the insanity determination because of the
injustice that may result if undue weight is given to psychiatric determinations. T.
SZAsz, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 95-108 (1963). See generally Ennis &
Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 CAIXF. L. REV. 693 (1974).
67. Ash, The Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnoses, 44 J. ABNORMAL & Soc.
PSYCH. 272 (1949).
68. Id.
69. Katz, Cole, & Lowery, Studies of the Diagnostic Process: The Influence of
Sympton Perception, Past Experience, and Ethnic Background in Diagnostic Deci-
sions, 125 AM. J. PSYCH. 937 (1969).
was normal.70
The Baxstrom studies provide a clear example of the precari-
ous reliability of psychiatric predictions.71 In Baxtrom v. Har-
old,72 the United States Supreme Court ordered the release or
civil commitment of those prisoner-patients who had been kept in
prison after expiration of their prison terms based upon a psychi-
atrist's diagnosis that they were dangerous. After the prisoners'
transfer to a civil institution, psychiatrists studied their subse-
quent conduct.7 3 In a study conducted by Hunt and Wiley one
year after their release, 147 of the 969 offenders affected by the de-
cision had been discharged to the community and the remaining
722 were found to be well behaved at the civil hospital.74 Several
years later, it was found that only two of the 262 prisoners who
were then discharged had been subsequently convicted of serious
crimes.7 5 If the psychiatrists had been permitted to dictate their
judgment to the court in this case, 969 human beings would have
been condemned to live out their lives behind bars, without home
visits and the other privileges granted civil patients.
76
Insanity cannot be proved as a scientific fact in the manner that
the determination of cancer or diseases of the body can be
proved. Instead, the insanity determination is a highly subjective
judgment based upon an individual decision of what is normal or
acceptable behavior.77 The pervasive influence of individual
prejudice in psychiatric diagnosis has been documented by at
least one researcher.7 8 In a controlled experiment conducted by
Lee and Temerlin in 1970, the diagnoses of psychiatric residents
were found to be influenced significantly by the psychiatrist's im-
agination of the socio-economic history of the patient, independ-
70. Id. at 939-40.
71. Steadman & Keveles, The Community Adjustment and Criminal Activity of
the Baxstrom Patients 1966-1970, 129 Am. J. PSYCH. 304 (1972).
72. 383 U.S. 107 (1906).
'73. See, e.g., Steadman & Keveles, The Community Adjustment and Criminal
Activity, of the Baxstrom Patients 1966-1970, 129 Am. J. PSYCH. 304 (1972); Hunt &
Wiley, Operation Bfxtrom After One Year, 124 Am. J. PSYCH. 978 (1968).
74. Hunt & Wiley, supra note 73.
75. Steadman & Keveles, supra note 73.
76. Ennis, The Rights of Mental Patients, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 484 (N.
Dorsen ed. 1970).
77. The psychology that dominates the law can best be described as a concept
thiat confuses morality and psychiatry. Insanity is a legal-medical constraint
shaped to meet either conscious or unconscious policy objectives. K. SnariNG, Es-
SAYS ON MENTAL INCAPACITY AND CRIMINAL CONDUCT 341-42 (1967).
The question of mental disease denotes theory, not fact. See Morris, Psychiatry
and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 514, 547 (1968). See also T. SzAsz,
LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 123-37 (1963).
78. See Temerlin, Social Class, Diagnosis and Prognosis for Psychotherapy, in
7 PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY RESEARCH & PRACTICE 181 (1970).
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ent of the clinical evidence.79 If the psychiatrists perceived a
history of lower socio-economic status, they were more likely to
diagnose a greater degree of mental illness and a lesser likelihood
of recovery.8 ° The study revealed a class bias among psychiatrists
against lower income persons.81 Psychiatric diagnosis may be
tainted by personal bias as well as class and cultural prejudice. 82
For example, a 1972 experiment conducted by Braginsky and
Braginsky showed that patients who voiced any criticism of the
mental health profession were likely to be diagnosed as mentally
ill, whereas patients who flattered the examiner and the health
profession were likely to receive a much more favorable diagnosis
and prognosis.8 3 Another study revealed that psychiatrists identi-
fied as normal and healthy those patients who tended to reflect
the psychiatrist's own upbringing, personality structure, and per-
sonal problems.
84
The Drew court refrained from adopting subpart 2 of the ALT
test, which extends the defense of insanity to psychopaths and
sociopaths.8 5 Although judgment upon the exclusion of soci-
opaths and psychopaths from the defense was deferred, the new
California test on its face would not deny the defense to those of-
fenders. There has been a wide divergence of opinion among psy-
chiatrists as to whether the term "mental disease" should





82. See Braginsky & Braginsky, Psychologists: High Priests of the Middle
Class, PSYCH. TODAY, Dec. 1973, at 15, 139.
83. Id.
84. See Raines & Rohrer, The Operational Matrix of Psychiatric Practice II:
Validity in Psychiatric Impressions and the Proiection Hupothesis, 117 Am. J.
PSYCH. 133 (1960).
85. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 345 n.8, 583 P.2d 1318, 1324 n.8, 149 Cal. Rptr.
275, 281 n.8 (1978).
86. Because there has been no definitive answer to the question of how to deal
with sociopaths or psychopaths, some commentators urge that the law presume no
definitive answers. It is suggested that each case be decided upon an individual
basis. R. SnioN, THE JuRy AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 31 (1967).
A psychiatrist's willingness to classify a condition of the mind as a mental dis-
ease depends more on his personal philosophy than on factual criteria. H. WEI-
HOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH 86 (1956).
The concept of psychopathy is based upon the belief that the offender lacks
"moral sense" or remorse. Sociologists emphasize the psychological normality of
criminals. Their empirical studies have failed to demonstrate that neurotic or
psychotic behavior is any greater in criminals than in the population at large. T.
SzASz, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 106 (1963).
chiatrists candidly confess that thus far they have been unsuc-
cessful in developing any effective cure for these persons.8 7 One
recent English study concluded that fines, imprisonment, or pro-
bation would probably be more effective means of treating some
psychopaths than hospitalization.88 The English Commission also
found a significantly lower rate of recidivism among psychopaths
who had been jailed than among those who had received treat-
ment at a psychiatric hospital.89
The ALI Language Will Not Prove to be Any Easier to Interpret
Than the M'Naghten Language
The primary rationale the court cited for replacing the
M'Naghten test was the superiority of the ALI terminology.90
Specifically the Drew court listed four reasons it believed the ALI
test was an improvement upon the M'Naghten test: (1) the "ca-
pacity to conform" language, (2) the "lack of substantial capacity"
phrase, (3) the "capacity to appreciate" phrase, and (4) avoidance
of the "all or nothing" language of M'Naghten.91 In order to com-
prehensively evaluate the ALI test, the terms "as a result of ' and
"mental disease" must also be considered.
The opinion refers repeatedly to the burdensome task of recon-
ciling the M'Naghten language with the modern psychiatric inter-
pretation of insanity.92 Ironically, application of the ALI test will
probably necessitate continual reinterpretation because of the
ambiguity of its terms. Moreover, there is some evidence that
Drew may not significantly expand the defense beyond those
classes of mentally ill offenders protected by M'Naghten.93
87. See generally BRrrisH COMMITTEE, supra note 15, at 83-97.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 84.
90. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 346, 583 P.2d 1318, 1325, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275, 282
(1978).
91. Id.
92. In the opinion of the court, the continuing inadequacy of the M'Naghten
test could not be remedied by further attempts to interpret language from a dated
era of psychologicdl thought. Id. at 345, 583 P.2d at 1324, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
93. In a series of mock jury tests, researchers found that jurors generally
could not distinguish between the M'Naghten and Durham tests. This would ap-
pear to apply equally to the ALI test, as it is a less radical departure from
M'Naghten than was the Durham formula. R. SiioN, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE
oF INsANrrY 200 (1967).
"[Ilt may be doubted that a change in the substantive formulation of the in-
sanity defense will have any significant effect upon actual practice .... " Sherry,
Penal Code Revision Project-Progress Report, 43 CAI. ST. B.J. 900, 916 (1968).
In formulating the Currens test, Judge Biggs based his reluctance to adopt the
precise wording of the ALI test upon the belief that it made cognition too promi-
nent and that jurors would use it to restore M'Naghten to the courtroom. United
States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774 n.32 (3d Cir. 1961).
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Criticism of the ALI rule has been nearly as pervasive as at-
tacks upon the M'Naghten test.9 4 The phrase "capacity to con-
form" has received the brunt of these condemnations.95
"Capacity to conform" was especially favored by the Drew court
because that phrase extends protection to persons suffering from
volitional disorders. 96 Under M'Naghten, persons who could artic-
ulate the wrongfulness of their conduct but who were unable to
control their behavior could not invoke the insanity defense.97
The threshold issue presented by the "capacity to conform"
phrase is whether the actor could have behaved in a different
manner.98 One commentator contends that such a determination
is beyond the realm of rational and reliable prediction.99 Other
commentators suggest that this term reactivates the widely criti-
cized theory of irresistible impulse. 00 This theory presumes that
there are persons incapable of resisting the impulse to behave in
a deviant manner and contends that such persons should be judg-
ed insane.101 However, failure of the defendant to resist his aber-
rant impulse is often the only proof of his inability to conform.102
Objection to the irresistible impulse theory focuses on the fact
that absent a history of such behavior, there is no basis in logic or
science for concluding that certain acts are irresistible. Yet psy-
chiatrists testify as to inability to conform based upon the single
act. 0 3
The phrase "lack of substantial capacity" is also susceptible to
differing interpretations depending on the interpretation of "sub-
94. See, e.g., BRITISH COMMIT EE, supra note 15, at 221; I. SiLviNG, ESSAYS ON
MENTAL INCAPACITY AND CRnmINAL CONDUCT 94-101 (1967).
95. The British Commission cites the test of "capacity to conform" as a princi-
pal reason for its rejection of the ALI test as a substitute for the M'Naghten rule.
BRriSH CoMI rIE, supra note 15, at 221.
96. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 346, 583 P.2d 1318, 1325, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275, 282
(1978).
97. Id.
98. H. SiLviNG, ESSAYS ON MENTAL INCAPACrrY AND CRIMINAL CONDUCT 105
(1967).
99. Id.
100. See BRrrsm ComMrE, supra note 15, at 221.
101. "Whatever may be the abstract truth, the law has never recognized an im-
pulse as uncontrollable which yet leaves the reasoning powers-including the ca-
pacity to appreciate the nature and quality of the particular act-unaffected by
mental disease." People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 726, 336 P.2d 492, 498-99 (1959).
102. See BRITISH Com 'ITEE, supra note 15, at 221.
103. Id.
stantial."10 4 The code draftsmen have provided little clarification
of this term.105 Without guidelines, the criteria for substantial ca-
pacity will have to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
"Capacity to appreciate" adds nothing to the M'Naghten test. In
fact, the Drew court frankly admitted that this is the same mean-
ing that has been ascribed to M'Naghten's "know" term.106
The "all or nothing" language of M'Naghten presumably refers
to that rule's exclusive emphasis upon cognitive disorders. This
aspect of the opinion agrees with those commentators who claim
the M'Naghten test language is too narrow.107 However, the Drew
court repeats this criticism without employing any independent
analysis of the issue. The M'Naghten test as modernly applied
does not compel an "all or nothing" decision of insanity based on
the defendant's capacity to know that his act was wrong. Inter-
pretation of M'Naghten under the Wolff and Wells lines of cases
demonstrates that the California version of M'Naghten is a flex-
ible test. 08 The courts have required more than mere capacity to
articulate knowledge of wrong as a bar to the defense. The de-
fendant cannot be found criminally responsible unless he "appre-
ciates and understands" the gravity of his act.109 The Cantrell
line of cases further liberalized the doctrine by permitting mitiga-
tion of a defendant's punishment if the act was caused by irresis-
tible impulse." 0
Judge Bazelon, who has long advocated a flexible approach to
criminal responsibility, was among the first commentators to criti-
cize the "as a result" clause of the AM test. In United States v.
Brawner, n' he vigorously assailed the "result" term as a reincar-
104. See 1L SILVING, ESSAYS ON MENTAL INCAPAcrrY AND CRnUAL CONDucT 98-
99 (1967).
105. The code draftsmen merely indicated that "substantial incapacity" means
that if capacity is greatly impaired, that should be sufficient for the purposes of
the test. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, Comment at 159 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
106. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 346, 583 P.2d 1318, 1325, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275, 282
(1978). Drew confirmed the "capacity to appreciate" language of People v. Wolff,
61 Cal. 2d 795, 801, 394 P.2d 959, 962, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271, 274 (1964).
107. See H. SILviNG, ESSAYS ON MENTAL INcAPAcrry AND CRImAL CoNDucT 92
(1967). See also United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720, 724-26 (6th Cir. 1968).
Contemporary psychiatry and psychology emphasize that man's social behavior
is determined more by how he has learned to behave than by. what he knows or
understands. Therefore, if M'Naghten were strictly interpreted, as the comrnenta-
tors assume, it would offer limited protection to mentally disordered defendants.
See J. POLS, THE RuLE OF LAw AND THE ROLE OF PsYcmATRY 20-22 (1968).
108. See People v. Wolff 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964);
People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 220 P.2d 53 (1949).
109. People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 800-01, 394 P.2d 959, 962, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271, 274
(1964).
110. People v. Cantrell, 8 Cal. 3d 672, 504 P.2d 1256, '105 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1973).
111. 471 F.2d 969, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
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nation of the Durham "product" test. The product test had per-
mitted psychiatrists to testify in conclusory terms and did not
require testimony as to how they arrived at their decision." 2 As a
result, the jury was denied the opportunity to determine as the
trier of fact whether the defendant's act was caused by mental ill-
ness. 1 1 3 Because psychiatrists failed to establish a causative link
between mental illness and the criminal act, juries did not believe
that the act was a product of mental disease and tended to convict
the defendant.114 To avoid this consequence, the California courts
may be forced to reinterpret the "as a result" phrase. The prefer-
able alternative, however, would be to require psychiatrists to es-
tablish the causative link between mental illness and the act
before being permitted to testify that the act was a result of
mental disease.
Drew made no attempt to define "mental disease." Dr. Szasz
contends that the term is meaningless, as "mental disease" de-
notes theory and not medical fact."5 Therefore, what constitutes
mental disease may vary widely from one psychiatrist to another,
depending upon his individual concept of what behavior is suffi-
ciently aberrant to constitute "disease." Adopting a standard
based on individual philosophy may effectively preclude an in-
sanity defense in certain cases but allow the defense in other
cases, even though the diagnosed mental disorders in the two sit-
uations are identical.
Will ALI "Rationalize" the Diminished Capacity Cases?
Justice Tobriner states that adoption of the ALI formula '"pro-
vides the foundation on which we can order and rationalize the
convoluted and occasionally inconsistent law of diminished ca-
pacity."" 6 Unfortunately, the opinion offers no more in the way
of reasoned analysis or clarification than to express dissatisfac-
tion with the doctrine's applications." 7 The opinion does not dis-
112. Id. at 1022-23.
113. Id. at 1022-23, 1027.
114. Id. at 1023.
115. T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 133 (1963).
116. People v. Drew, 22 CaL 3d 333, 346, 583 P.2d 1318, 1325, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275, 282
(1978).
117. "If the defendant is charged with a general intent crime, he cannot raise a
defense of diminished capacity.... If evidence of diminished capacity is used to
negate criminal intent in a crime which contains no lesser offense ... the defend-
cuss recent developments in the "diminished capacity" line of
cases.
The recent "diminished capacity" cases show a marked trend
toward merging that defense with the insanity exemption." 8 Peo-
ple v. Wetmoren 9 compels the admission of all evidence of in-
sanity at the guilt phase of trial if diminished capacity is pleaded.
If insanity is also pleaded, the same evidence will be admitted a
second time for the insanity trial. Because there is a duplication
of evidence at both trials, bifurcation seems unnecessary.
Drew's adoption of the "capacity to conform" phrase of the ALI
test may complete the merger of the two defenses as both dimin-
ished capacity and the "capacity to conform" standards speak to
volitional disorders.120 Merger of the two doctrines would eclipse
the distinction between diminished capacity and insanity because
diminished capacity would then satisfy the test for insanity.
At its inception, the diminished capacity standard was inter-
preted as only a partial defense to criminal responsibility.121 It
recognized varying degrees of mental incapacity by permitting
mitigation of punishment for offenses committed by persons too
disturbed to be held fully accountable for their acts.
122
This was accomplished by recognizing a volitional disorder as a
denial of specific intent in the crime charged, but allowing convic-
tion on the lesser included offense if it required only a general in-
tent.123 Diminished capacity provided only a partial release from
ant may secure his outright acquittal and release." Id. at 344, 583 P.2d at 1323-24,
149 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
118. See, e.g., People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318, 583 P.2d 1308, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265
(1978).
119. Id.
120. Diminished capacity speaks to those influences such as alcohol, disease or
trauma which impair a person's volition, and thereby negate that person's capacity
to entertain specific intent. See, e.g., People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 316, 411 P.2d
911, 914-15, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 818-19 (1966).
The Currens test for insanity adopted by the Third Circuit employed the follow-
ing definition of insanity: ' The jury must be satisfied that at the time of commit-
ting the act the defendant as a result of mental disease or defect lacked
substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law he is
alleged to have violated." United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 1961).
In commenting on the Currens test Dr. Diamond has noted that the "capacity to
conform" phraseology provides an opportunity for the expert to describe volitional
disorders. Diamond, From M'Naghten to Currens, and Beyond, 50 CALIF. L. REv.
189, 191 (1962). Thus, California's incorporation of the "capacity to conform" lan-
guage in Drew results in inclusion of volitional disorders in both the insanity test
and the diminished capacity test. See People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 583 P.2d 1318,
149 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1978).
121. See generally Comment, Diminished Capacity: The Middle Ground of
Criminal Responsibility, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 911 (1974-1975).
122. Id. See also People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949).
123. Comment, Diminished Capacity: The Middle Ground of Criminal Respon-
sibility, 15 SANTA CLARA I. R-V. 911, 921 (1974-1975). For a contrast between the
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penal culpability. In contrast with diminished capacity, the ALI
test will provide a total exemption from punishment for volition-
ally disordered defendants.124 Thus, "rationalization" of dimin-
ished capacity may mean elimination of the difference between
insanity and diminished capacity and, therefore, expansion of in-
sanity to include diminished capacity offenders.
Policy Issues Drew Failed to Consider
The Drew court failed to consider what the community reaction
might be to an expansion of the insanity defense.125 At least one
commentator maintains that any insanity standard should reflect
community values. 126 Specifically, Dr. Goldstein contends that
the decision to exempt a mentally disordered person from punish-
ment necessarily requires a moral judgment.127 In a democratic
society such moral judgments are more appropriately made by
the representative body than the courts.
One possible indication of the public point of view might be
drawn from an analysis of a California Senate bill that was pend-
ing when Drew was decided. 2 8 The Drew court failed to acknowl-
edge that the matter was under current legislative consider-
ation.12 9 Proposed Penal Code section 3302(a) set forth the fol-
goals of psychiatry and the practical needs of law in the context of diminished ca-
pacity, see Comment, A Punishment Rationale for Diminished Capacity, 18
U.C.L-.A L. REV. 561, 571 (1971).
124. See People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 346, 583 P.2d 1318, 1325, 149 Cal. Rptr.
275, 282 (1978).
125. The public opposes expansion of the insanity defense because it fears that
soft-hearted judges will find the perpetrators of crime insane and release them to
prey upon the innocent. M. GOULETr, THE INsANrrY DEFENSE IN CRIuMINAL TRIALS
163-65 (1965); see Comment, Diminished Capacity: The Middle Ground of Crimi-
nal Responsibility, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 911 (1974-1975).
For nonlegal commentary on the nature and complexity of the insanity defense
and the general problem it presents to the public in the context of the "44 caliber
killer" see Gambino, The Murderous Mind: Insanity vs. the Law, SATURDAY REV.,
March 18, 1978, at 10.
126. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 90-91.
127. Id.
128. S.B. 27, Cal. Legis., 1977-1978 Reg. Sess. § 1. The bill died in Senate but was
revived after the Drew decision. See CAuFOmA SENATE FINAL HISTORY, 1977-1978
REG. SESS. 30. See also S3B. 134, Cal. Legis., 1978-1979 Reg. Sess. The new bill, as
amended August 29, 1979, deletes the insanity test set forth in the text but contin-
ues to operate under the assumption that diminished capacity is a viable defense.
It sets forth procedures for examination of a defendant pleading diminished
capacilty. Id.
129. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 355, 583 P.2d 1318, 1331, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275, 288
(1978) (Richardson, J., dissenting).
lowing definition of insanity:
[A] person is not criminally responsible for an offense if, at the time of
the offense, as the result of a diseased or deranged condition of the mind,
he lacked sufficient capacity to know or understand the nature and quality
of his act or to know or understand that his conduct was wrong.130
The language of the proposal indicates a significantly narrower
classification of mentally impaired offenders than that embraced
by Drew.
Choice of the term "capacity to know" indicates that the propo-
sal is like M'Naghten in that it emphasizes the cognitive aspects
of mental disorders.13l Similarly, the phrase "sufficient capacity
to know or understand" nearly parallels the judicial construction
given to "know" in People v. Wolff.132 Significantly, there is no
mention of the lack of "capacity to conform" which would
broaden the scope of the defense to include the volitional charac-
teristics of the ALI rule. The only cogent distinctions between the
senate bill and M'Naghten are the "as the result of" clause and
the characterization of insanity as a "diseased and deranged con-
dition of the mind." Neither phrase would broaden the scope of
the rule beyond those mental disorders recognized by the
M'Naghten test.133 This conservative definition of insanity is also
more consistent with the public view of insanity than is the Drew
test.13 4
Creating a fair and workable definition of insanity is more a pol-
icy issue than a medical-factual determination. In formulating
such a policy decision, there should be a careful consideration
of the objectives of the insanity defense, the patterns of conduct
within prisons and mental institutions, and the societal conse-
quences of confinement in mental institutions in contrast to pris-
ons.1 35 The extensive research required for a comprehensive
130. S.B. 27, Cal. Legis., 1977-1978 Reg. Sess. § 1.
131. For interpretation of the language of the various insanity tests, see A.
GOLDsTEmN, note 11 supra; H. SILvING, ESSAYS ON MENTAL INCAPACrrY AND CRa-
NAL CONDUCT 92 (1967).
132. 61 Cal. 2d 795, 800-01, 394 P.2d 959, 962-63, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271, 274-75 (1964).
133. In the March 6, 1979 amendment to proposed S.B. 134, Cal. Legis., 1978-1979
Reg. Sess., the committee stated that it was displeased with the Drew definition
and set forth the following definition of insanity:.
[I]nsanity means a diseased or deranged condition of the mind which
makes a person incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and
quality of his act or makes a person incapable of knowing or understand-
ing that his act was wrong, in conformity with the definitions applied by
the courts prior to such recent decisions.
This definition of insanity is almost identical to the proposed Penal Code
§ 3302(a). See text accompanying note 130 supra.
134. See generally H. GouLETr, TnE I~sANrry DEFENSE IN CRImINAL TRiALs 163-
65 (1965).
135. See Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"--Why Not?, 72 YALE
L.J. 853, 872 (1963); Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L
REv. 514, 546 (1968).
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evaluation of these factors and the desirability of a societal man-
date clearly indicate that the legislature is better suited for reso-
lution of the insanity issue than the courts. 36
CONCLUSION
In People v. Drew, the California Supreme Court replaced the
M'Naghten insanity test with a formula they believed would
achieve a more accurate determination of criminal responsibility.
However, the available evidence indicates that the ALI rule will
not accomplish the changes the court sought to effectuate. Psy-
chiatric testimony will continue to be phrased according to the
test language. Psychiatrists will continue to testify in conclusory
terms without adequate explanation of the factual bases for their
conclusions. The ALI language will not prove any easier to apply
than the M'Naghten test. Moreover, increased deference to an en-
hanced psychiatric role will not foster a more just and humane
disposition of the accused, as the court believed it would. Adop-
tion of the ALI rule may subsume the diminished capacity test
without the court ever addressing the distinctions between dimin-
ished capacity and insanity.
Determination of a standard for criminal insanity necessarily
involves a moral decision. As such it requires the participation of
those who more directly represent the interests of the community
136. The basic problem underlying the Drew analysis is that the California ju-
diciary is institutionally ill-equipped to decide policy questions like the insanity
definition. Resolution of such problems requires extensive accumulation and eval-
uation of scientific and sociological data. The California Supreme Court lacks the
large staff and extensive fact finding resources which are available to the legisla-
ture. See generally Note, Li v. Yellow Cab Company-Judicial Activism Illus-
trated, 30 AiuK. L. REV. 557, 569 (1977). See also Comment, An Appraisal of
Judicial Restraint, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 75, 92 (1973).
Widespread utilization of the calendar memorandum is another reason the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court should exercise prudence in considering broad policy
changes. Use of the calendar memo often requires that painstaking research and
analysis be sacrificed for the sake of expediency. What happens under this sys-
tem is that when a case is accepted for hearing, responsibility for research and
analysis passes to a single justice. That justice in turn, has his law clerk prepare a
memorandum which, in essence, predetermines the resolution. The memo is cir-
culated to the other members of the court, thereby devaluing the importance of
oral argument. Johnson, The Supreme Court of California 1975-1976, Foreword.
The Accidental Decision and How It Happens, 65 CAIXF. L REV. 231, 248-50 (1977).
California appellate courts employ an analogous procedure. Judges are often
compelled to "take on faith" the other justices' comments on the calendar memo-
randum concerning the record in a particular case. See Wold, Going Through the
Motions: The Monotony of Appellate Court Decisionmaking, 62 JuD. 58, 64 (1978).
at large and who are institutionally equipped to examine the
spectrum of available experience and information. The issue of
criminal insanity must be addressed by the California Legisla-
ture.
PAUL A. TRAFCANTE
